Today a few members of our team are coming forward to the story of how they hacked into one of the most secretive and secured privately held businesses in the world. Aliens, hacking, and government secrets are all inbound and slated to release over the next weeks. We have it all, and you want proof, of course. You always put the burden of proof on us truthers, and someday we are going to take the time to tell you how one-sided and toxic this relationship is, but today we are just going to give you what you asked for. With a newly signed pact amongst our group, we have collectively decided to start sharing verifiable details on this site cautiously. The first disclosure will be related to Lockheed Martin.

Precautionary Measures

As of this writing, a member of our collective has worked with multiple organizations and law firms to ensure that retaliation cannot happen without mutually assured destruction. We are time-delaying the release of information. We do not intend to share assets that could be interpreted as a threat to any corporate or military power. Our manifesto is not to disclose recent or pertinent state or corporate secrets. No Cap is not a radical or terrorist group and will never promote anti government or businesses actions. Our members are purveyors of truth and disclosure. We think it’s time for the general public to be informed and have an accurate history and sense of reality. Especially when it comes to private corporations like Lockheed Martin and it’s operators like Larry Lawson, who act above the law and operate more like a mafia. We also desire to see more oversight and disclosure happening for true democracy to come back and rebuild free and informed nations. But I digress. You’ll either heed this warning or you’ll do what you do.

FOR THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEOPLE

Our Defense Against Lockheed

The founders, members, sources, and affiliates of No Cap are under our protection. Upon any suspicious deaths, disappearances, or any gross retaliation, our massive database of secrets will be made fully public. Our collective database contains over 2 petabytes of information from Lockheed, FBI, CIA, NSA, and other unnamed organizations. The entirety of this data has been a collective project for the No Cap team spanning more than 20 years. We have worked to embed this database across both public domains and the dark web. Using blockchain and steganography, we have carefully woven our collective assets and stories in places that will be absolutely impossible to destroy. The only thing stopping the average user from getting information hidden in plain sight is the decryption keys which we have carefully distributed through cold storage solutions to parties paid to monitor and protect us.

Your Responsibility

Download and make copies. There is information all over this website and others that we link to. Save images to your computer. Print screen and save PDFs. At any point, we could get shut down and silenced. Your role to play, for now, is simple if you want us to keep escalating disclosure:

  • Subscribe so that we can push directly to your inbox (save those to your computer too)
  • Share on every social account you can, especially Reddit and 4chan
  • Contact us if you care to contribute and help (it’s a lot of work)

I’m sure it’s easy to dismiss those instructions as a type of marketing ploy, but do you see a monetization strategy anywhere? We don’t have one. We volunteer and front exorbitant costs out of pocket because we are passionate and we care about the truth. But we expect our readers to do their part, in part because distribution keeps us safe, and in part because we are sick of seeing other credible whistleblowers being dismissed.

Preface

If you have read some of our content already, then it should be no surprise to you that members of our community come from very notable security groups. The pronoun “we” in this article can be assumed as our hackers who collectively co-wrote this article.

For the names and organizations that we mention in this article, it’s worth noting that we’re sharing old news and that these exploits and back doors are no longer relevant. We also want to say:

Sorry Larry! It’s nothing personal but we do believe in eye for an eye. Our eyes are already poked, but if you want to take a shot at someone might we recommend the executive leadership of an over-valued startup? They’ll lead you to the right person over here at No Cap real quick.

Also, we’d love for you to join our disclosure project and share some stories! 😏

– The Operation CockFeed Team

Change Management

Government organizations and private businesses with strict compliance and security all face the same problem: change is painful for them. They know it and we know it. It’s one of the things that we keep an eye on waiting for the opportunity to strike. In our little community, we call these types of hackers “vipers.” They don’t care to take the risk involved with average or petty hacks. They wait, sometimes decades, for the right prey to come along. Vipers have particular motivators. For some it’s hacking into the FBI to flex and for others it’s taking down Playstation Network to defend one of our own. Someone has to keep organizations in check, right?

In both of those instances, the vulnerabilities were already known well before the attack was executed. Vipers strike when it suits them. Asking across our team, the average number of backdoors was an astonishing 20+ per person. Funny coincidence that we didn’t know until we discussed the topic: every member of our team has a backdoor to one or more Amazon services.

Targeting Larry and Skunk Works

When the opportunity presented itself to potentially breach Lockheed, which has notoriously great security, a few members of our team rallied around what we would codename “Operation CockFeed.” Larry Lawson was our target. No offense meant to the guy, but he was the “cock” and a trojan horse was what we aimed to feed him. He unknowingly ate it up.

I’ve removed some of the breadcrumbs. They are still present but a little less forward. Some of the authors are fine making simple public statements, but for the interest of the collective, I feel the need to redact.

If you want a hint to verify and find the connections, start with Larry’s LinkedIn employment history and compare that to some of our war stories.

– Editor

We had word that Lockheed was shifting corporate leadership and the source was good old-fashioned church gossip. This was an opportunity to strike and we had a viper in mind for the attack. So we had our Cock in hand and we were ready to go to work.

Executing the Attack

We had to think hard about our approach vector because we knew he would have strict NIST security policies in place. We originally thought of proxying through an unsuspecting member of the congregation would allow us to infiltrate Larry but figured if he was smart, work wouldn’t come home with him and keep physical security tight. Ultimately we devised a plan that would encompass a personal proxy attack and a few others:

  • Testing physical and device home security
  • Approaching through known associates in business
  • Evil Twin attack at places he frequents

We had a solid plan and target. In total, we had about a dozen attack vectors. So we divided and conquered, established our comms protocols, and waited to see if anyone pinged with a successful breach. We locked in two points of entry: one through a presentation embedded with malware and another through a form of twinning. We didn’t go right for Lockheed servers as tempting as it was. Instead, we monitored personal comms to identify changes in leadership that hadn’t been fully locked in. The theory was simple: if we can infiltrate incoming leadership before they’re adherent to Lockheed’s protocols in full, we can use a human almost like a zero-day exploit in software. Infecting the personnel, instead of the systems. Our viper had been patient for years and he wasn’t about to let a small victory blind him to the risk ahead.

Tactical Precision

Our viper has a military background and was once an employee at Lockheed. Every step of the way viper instructed the team on the importance of tactics and timing. Larry was the carrier and WE were the virus. We had to assume that there would be honeypots and intrusion detection everywhere at Lockheed so we took our time infecting the personnel and attacking from obscure angles. Another member of the team had worked with Intel and knew that personal device security was the weakest point for most prestigious organizations. One by one, we infected a few corporate leaders. We were in, but where to go from here?

Viper had the answers for that too. Another associate had made an app that exploited beacon technology. He had embedded malicious code into a popular open-source package for app developers to use. It was a rare and extremely valuable exploit not because it allowed access into anything, but because any company targeted would get a false flag signal. It wasn’t valuable on its own to get in, but it was the perfect exploit for our team to create a distraction while we did our work and poked around the servers.

The Lockheed Hack: H.E.L.P.S Strategy

So we planned out the attack as follows calling it the H.E.L.P.S. strategy:

  • Use the beacon backdoor to ping a suspicious Chinese-hosted IP address (red herring)
  • Create additional backdoors on intranet and personnel devices (embed)
  • Hope that the company is most concerned that the attack is external (lock-down)
  • Operate compromised workstations to browse the network and survey (probe)
  • Grab some small but nominal assets that would look like a typical user (sample)

We were entrenched in Lockheed’s systems. Instead of having to pull assets all at once and be cut off by a watchdog intrusion system, we sat on personnel devices for months, slowly drawing down a massive amount of data. It was a slow drip that wasn’t cut off until we pulled out. We had to constantly push the boundaries of our comfort zone as every minute that passed, we were at risk. But as far as we know and can tell: they never had a clue we were there!

The Aftermath

Our team had mixed feelings as we sifted through the data. Viper wanted to take the data public because it was a blow to a government and corporation that had robbed them of quality of life. One member of our team has been dark for weeks, terrified of government retaliations and personal safety after browsing through state secrets. Every single one of us knew that we had something incredibly dangerous on our hands. Some of the most coveted and highly guarded secrets in the world. We had to come up with a plan. Imagine yourself in this scenario and really try to picture going through this in all the gravity and horrifying reality it entails and then ask yourself:

  • What do I do with this information?
  • What organization can protect me?
  • What country would I be safe in?
  • How will it end: death or prison?
  • Where can I possibly hide this information?
  • How long will it take to feel safe?

Decentralization of Lockheed Assets

After much deliberation, we landed on decentralization. Governments fear blockchain technology because it decentralizes finance and access to information. The other main concern is how successful it’s been at creating decentralized networks and how quickly it became global. This technology is so much more than currency. It’s a history and database in plain sight. The type of technology that has protected hackers for years, but evolved and picked up by average folk.

We have been embedding and decentralizing our own assets everywhere we can think of. The first milestone of peace and safety was knowing the data was no longer on any personal device or servers. This has been months of work for many of us. There is so much information from Lockheed and other breaches that we are still a long ways off from completing the public distribution.

But now that time has elapsed and we are seeing an uptick of disclosure happening as well as protections granted by congress, that’s all about to change. We’re not giving up all the secrets yet, but stay tuned. There’s more! In the meantime, go probe Larry’s background and see if a former executive is willing to give up secrets. We have lots of questions ourselves related to operations “Out There,” “Laser Beam,” and “Mixed Reality.”

We will disclose more soon, so check back. But in the meantime, do your part. The burden of proof is a shared responsibility, and if you help us, we’ll help you!

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